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SIXTH TIME’S THE CHARM: RETHINKING THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT TO ACHIEVE
PRACTICAL REFORM
By
Morgan Stanley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, federal legislators have proposed arbitration reforms
through the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would limit the use of arbitration agreements
to those arising after the beginning of a consumer or employment dispute. While the
Arbitration Fairness Act would prevent the use of arbitration agreements in contracts of
adhesion, and greatly limit the use of arbitration in consumer and employment contexts,
the Act fails to rectify the power disparity between individuals, and repeat-player
businesses once arbitration begins. As there is little chance of Congress passing preclusive
arbitration reform under the Trump Administration,1 legislators should instead propose
practical reform measures that mandate the use of consumer-friendly arbitration terms, and
greater disclosure of arbitration results and arbitrator decisions. By doing so, legislators
can garner bipartisan support for practical arbitration reform, rather than continue to
promote the same tired, unsuccessful bill.
II.

A LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE

Federal legislators have made several recent efforts to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act
(“AFA”),2 which would amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to preclude the use of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements (“PDAAs”) in consumer and employment contracts.3
Although introduced six times since 2007, the Act has failed to garner sufficient support to
*

Morgan Stanley is a Managing Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2019 Juris Doctor Candidate at
Penn State Law.
1

George Friedman, A New Congressional Attempt to Curb Arbitration Agreements: A More Focused Attack
that’s also Doomed to Fail, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR (Feb. 14, 2016),
http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/new-congressional-attempt-curb-arbitration-agreements-focusedattack-thats-also-doomed-fail/ (Noting that several attempts to amend the FAA to limit the use of mandatory
arbitration have failed when Republicans have held Congress and the White House).
2

See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Garen E. Dodge, Congress Considers
Limiting Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context, Nat’l Law Rev. (Mar. 17, 2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-considers-limiting-pre-dispute-arbitration-agreementsemployment-context.
3

See H.R. 1374; H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong.
(2011); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). (The arbitration fairness act was
initially introduced in the 110th Congress, and has been reintroduced before every Congress through 2017).
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pass.4 Meanwhile, Supreme Court jurisprudence has strengthened the validity and
enforceability of PDAAs,5 and many businesses include pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
contracts to the extent of ubiquity.6 Given the Supreme Court’s favorable view of
mandatory arbitration agreements, and the broad use of such clauses by businesses,
arbitration reform will likely be achieved only by new legislation.7
Under the Trump Administration, passage of the 2017 version of the AFA8 into law
appears less likely than ever.9 In addition, after the rejection of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) arbitration rule in 2017,10 broad, preclusive reform
measures are unlikely to win Congress’ approval.11 Now, however, publicity surrounding
the AFA has brought PDAAs into the public eye, and support for arbitration reform has
grown.12
Unfortunately, the current draft of the AFA neither addresses the procedural
shortcomings of consumer arbitration, nor attempts to manage the power disparity between
repeat-player corporations and consumers, who have little choice but to agree to arbitration
4

See Javier J. Castro, Employment Arbitration Reform: Preserving the Right to Class Proceedings in
Workplace Disputes, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 241, 265 (2014) (“This bill has drawn considerable support
in the Senate, yet it has so far been unable to obtain the requisite number of votes to get past committee.”).
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration Law in a Nutshell, 4th ed., 378 (“In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), the Court legitimated adhesive arbitration contracts. An obligation to
arbitrate can be unilaterally imposed by the stronger party on its weaker counterpart . . . ”).
5

6

See CFPB, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, § 2, at 8 (2015) [hereinafter Arbitration Study] (listing that 99.9% of mobile
wireless contracts, and 98.5% of storefront payday loan contracts include a mandatory arbitration clause).
7

See Castro, supra note 4, at 264-65.

8

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017).

9

George Friedman, A New Congressional Attempt to Curb Arbitration Agreements: A More Focused Attack
that’s also Doomed to Fail, SECURITIES ARBITRATION COMMENTATOR (Feb. 14, 2016),
http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/new-congressional-attempt-curb-arbitration-agreements-focusedattack-thats-also-doomed-fail/.
10

See 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017) (Limiting the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial
products and services, and precluding the use of class-action waivers).
11

Evan Weinberger, Trump Officially Kills CFPB Arbitration Rule, LAW 360 (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:35 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/980811/trump-officially-kills-cfpb-arbitration-rule. (“The U.S. Senate
passed its version of the [Congressional Review Act] resolution of disapproval of the CFPB’s arbitration rule
on a 51-50 vote with Vice President Mike Pence breaking a tie on Oct. 24. That followed a July vote in the
U.S. House of Representatives to overturn the rule.”)
12

Sylvan Lane, GOP Polling Firm: Bipartisan Support for Consumer Bureau Arbitration Rule, THE HILL
(Oct. 5, 2017, 5:29 PM EDT), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/354143-gop-polling-firm-finds-bipartisansupport-for-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule; Stephen Rouzer, New Poll: Overwhelming Support for CFPB
Arbitration Rule in Arizona and Maine, Fair Arbitration Now (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.fairarbitrationnow.org/new-poll-overwhelming-support-cfpb-arbitration-rule-arizona-maine/
(The polling was conducted by Public Policy Polling, a polling firm associated with the Democratic Party).
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clauses in consumer contracts.13 Drafters of the AFA should instead propose practical
reform measures to mitigate the inherent disparities between resource-rich companies and
the ordinary consumer, which would establish a fairer arbitration process and garner more
bipartisan support for the Act. Legislators concerned with arbitration reform should strike
now, while the public is informed and academics continue to criticize the current state of
consumer arbitration.14
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
A.

Arbitration: From Niche Practice to a Premier Alternative to Litigation

Prior to federalization in 1925, 17th century common law governed arbitration.15 Courts
viewed PDAAs as efforts to circumvent the courts’ jurisdiction,16 and parties were
permitted to withdraw from arbitration at any point before the arbitrator issued an award.17
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act,18 which legitimized arbitration
in maritime transactions and commerce,19 and explicitly provided that “an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”20 The FAA also dictated
procedures for arbitrator selection and granted arbitrators the authority to compel witness
testimony.21 Furthermore, the FAA ensured that arbitration proceedings would remain
13

Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 378.

14

Taylor Lincoln & David Arkush, The Arbitration Debate Trap: How Opponents of Corporate
Accountability
Distort
the
Debate
on
Arbitration,
PUBLIC CITIZEN
(July
2008),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/arbitrationdebatetrapfinal.pdf; Carbonneau, supra note 4, at 378.
15

Steven A. Certilman, This Is a Brief History of Arbitration in the United States, 3 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW
10, 12 (2010); see also Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
Certilman supra note 15, at 12; see also Kill v. Hollister, 95 E.R. 532 (K.B. 1742) (stating that “the
agreement of the parties [to arbitrate] cannot oust this court.”).
16

17

Certilman supra note 15, at 12; see also Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and
Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2011) (“[C]ourts permitted either party to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement to revoke the agreement at any time before the entry of an award”); Vynior’s Case 77
E.R. 597 (1609). (“So also it would seem that a revocation, made before a Judge's order is made a rule of
Court, is also a revocation of the submission; and therefore the submission being gone, there remains nothing
to make a rule of Court. . . .”)
18

Arbitration Act., Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2017)).

19

9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).

20

9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).

21

9 U.S.C. §§ 5, 7 (1947).
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subject to judicial review when necessary, and provided a mechanism to vacate arbitration
awards that resulted from corruption, fraud, or arbitrator misconduct. 22
In the following years, the Supreme Court expanded and strengthened arbitration’s
position in the United States.23 In 1967, the Court’s decision in Prima Paint Corp v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co (“Prima Paint”) established the separability doctrine, which directed
that arbitration agreements are enforceable unless challenged on grounds of contract
validity.24 The same year, the Court overturned a California law that exempted franchise
cases from arbitration, holding that by enacting a substantive rule applicable in both state
and federal courts, “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”25 Three years later, the Court recognized that
Section 2 of the FAA, which presumes that arbitration clauses are valid and enforceable,26
represents a “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”27 and ruled that, “as a matter
of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration . . . .”28 Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the courts must grant
motions to compel arbitration, regardless of potential judicial inefficiency over related
22

9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein
the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.).
23

See e.g Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1980).
Prima Paint Corp, 388 U.S. at 403 (“[T]he federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once it
is satisfied that "the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply [with the arbitration
agreement] is not in issue.”).
24

25

Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.

See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947) (“. . . an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
26

27

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

28

Id. at 24-25.
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claims.29 The Supreme Court thus firmly established that the FAA governs disputes
concerning arbitration.30
B.

The Rise of Consumer Arbitration and Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements

Recognizing the merits of arbitration over litigation,31 businesses began to include predispute arbitration clauses in their contracts.32 Consumers and employees, however, could
invalidate arbitration clauses under common law theories of contract validity, such as
unconscionability, so long as the challenging parties’ claims concerned the arbitration
clause itself.33 Courts often found PDAAs to be unconscionable, for example, when the
agreement conferred an unfair advantage to the party compelling arbitration.34 Provisions
that conferred an unfair advantage included provisions that granted only one party power
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (holding that “[t]he preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that
concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation,
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.”).
29

Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 2; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 465 U.S. at 24-25 (“The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself
or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”).
30

31

See Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, FRANCHISE L.J. 141-142
(Spring 1997) (“Absent unusual circumstances . . . [a] franchisor with an arbitration clause should be able to
require each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in a separate arbitration. Since many
(and perhaps most) of the putative class members may never do that, and because arbitrators typically do not
issue runaway awards, strict enforcement of an arbitration clause should enable the franchisor to reduce
dramatically its aggregate exposure”).
32

See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 273, 276 (1998) (ruling that an arbitration clause is
unenforceable when the respondent bank unilaterally included the clause after the parties had entered a
contract.);) DAI v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding DAI’s arbitration agreements,
precluding a state class action suit).
See Prima Paint Corp v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (stating that “if the claim
is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself -- an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the
agreement to arbitrate -- the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.”); Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 110
(“[FAA §2] expressly provided that agreements to arbitrate could be challenged only on the basis of standard
contract formation grounds (e.g., indefinite subject matter, lack of capacity in a contracting party, the failure
to coordinate offer and acceptance, the absence of consideration, or unconscionability)”).
33

Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “arbitration provisions that
confer an ‘unfair advantage’ upon the party with greater bargaining power are substantively
unconscionable.”) (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2003)).
34
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to select an arbitrator,35 restrict discovery,36 or limit an arbitrator’s authority when
determining an award.37 Courts examining such provisions often found that consumers
were stripped of their legal rights, including access to a remedy.38
Corporations responded to contemporary jurisprudence by including delegation clauses
in consumer agreements, which grant arbitrators authority to determine the validity of the
arbitration clause itself,39 a concept also known as kompetenz-kompetenz.40 The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of delegation clauses in 2010,41 thus further expanding the
separability doctrine established in Prima Paint, which had already limited challenges of
arbitration to those premised upon issues concerning contract validity.42 The Court
reasoned that a delegation clause is a separate agreement to arbitrate the validity of the
arbitration clause by itself.43 By establishing that delegation clauses are severable, the
Court provided a fast-track to arbitration for consumer disputes, which forces claimants to
first submit to arbitration to determine whether the delegation clause is conscionable before
being heard in court.44

35

Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (S.C. 1998) (finding a provision limiting arbitration
selection to a list of company approved arbitrators unconscionable).
36

Id. at 614; Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitration
provision limiting depositions of corporate representatives to four topics provided the employer an unfair
advantage).
Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (1997) (finding an arbitration agreement’s damages
restrictions unconscionable).
37

38

Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

39

See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010) (Upholding the validity of Rent-ACenter’s delegation provision, noting that “parties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’
such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate . . .”).
Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 29 (“Kompetenz-kompetenz, or jurisdiction to rule on jurisdictional
challenges, establishes that the arbitral tribunal can rule on matters relating to the validity and scope of the
agreement to arbitrate.”).
40

41

Id.

42

Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403-04.

See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., 561 U.S. at 71 (“a party's challenge to another provision of the contract, or
to the contract as a whole, does not prevent a court from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate.”).
43

44

Friedman, supra note 17, at 2048.
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C.

Concepcion, Italian Colors and the Consumer Arbitration Debate

In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has made PDAAs nearly impervious to
consumer and employer challenges of contract validity.45 In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion (“Concepcion”),46 the Supreme Court held that class action waivers in
consumer contracts of adhesion are enforceable, even when applied to small claims.47 The
Court overruled California’s decision to prohibit class action waivers in arbitration
agreements,48 reasoning that class-wide arbitration proceedings preclude individual claims,
judicialize arbitration proceedings,49 and increase defendants’ risk of being held liable,
especially due to the lack of multilayered review in arbitral proceedings.50 Concluding that
arbitration was ill-suited for class-wide proceedings,51 the Court upheld AT&T’s class
action waiver.52
The Court further established the enforceability of PDAAs in American Express v.
Italian Colors (“Italian Colors”), in which claimants sought class action arbitration
proceedings to avoid the costs of individual proceedings, which would exceed each
claimant’s total amount in controversy.53 Respondents argued that the class action waiver
was unenforceable because the claims were based on federal antitrust statutes, and the class
waiver precluded the claimant’s right to seek a remedy.54 The Court rejected American
Express’ argument, stating that, although the class action waiver may render claims too
expensive to pursue, the waiver did not actually preclude each claimant from seeking
relief.55 The Court clarified that class arbitration remained unavailable for consumers
seeking a remedy.56
45

Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 230.

46

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, (2011).

47

Id. at 352.

48

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a class action waiver
provision was unconscionable when applied to consumer claims alleging that a credit card company had
wrongfully charged customers a $29 late fee).
49

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347-48.

50

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.

51

Id. (noting that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation”).

52

Id. at 352.

53

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).

54

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2310.

Id. at 2311. (“that ‘[the class-action waiver] no more eliminates [the] parties’ right to pursue their statutory
remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938 . . . ”).
55

Id. at 2312. (concluding that class procedures “ . . . would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy
resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration, in particular, was meant to secure.”).
56
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The impact of Concepcion and Italian Colors is still debated. Conservative and probusiness groups argue that the decisions are pro-consumer,57 and commend the value of
arbitration as an accessible venue for consumers seeking redress.58 Conservatives contend
that the speed and informality of arbitration benefits consumers59 and that consumers may
simply refuse to enter contracts mandating arbitration.60 These decisions have also been
criticized by progressive and pro-consumer groups who reject the consumer-friendly
characterization of arbitration.61 Progressives argue that mandatory arbitration clauses
relieve corporations of accountability for abusive practices,62 and that consumers are less
successful in arbitration than in judicial proceedings.63
Regardless of the benefit that arbitration confers to consumers, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has insulated PDAAs from common law theories of contract
unenforceability, and courts almost always enforce arbitration agreements under Section 2
57

Ted Frank, Class Actions, Arbitration, and Consumer Rights: Why Concepcion is a Pro-Consumer
Decision, MANHATTAN INST., Legal Policy Report No.16 (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/class-actions-arbitration-and-consumer-rights-why-concepcion-pro-consumer-decision5896.html.
58

See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 30, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(“bilateral arbitration overwhelmingly increases access to justice for millions of individuals throughout the
Nation.”).
59

Hans von Spakovsky, The Unfair Attack on Arbitration: Harming Consumers by Eliminating a Proven
Dispute Resolution System, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 17, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/report/theunfair-attack-arbitration-harming-consumers-eliminating-proven-dispute-resolution-system.
60

Id.

61

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., Supporting Respondents at 18, Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (“the arbitration process poses significant barriers to the assertion of
consumer claims . . . ”).
62

Joe Valenti, The Case Against Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Clauses, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug.
2, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/08/02/142095/thecase-against-mandatory-consumer-arbitration-clauses/.
63

Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE
Briefing Paper #414 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/#epi-toc-2.
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of the FAA.64 Arbitration reform must therefore be realized through other non-judicial
avenues. The AFA remains a potential vehicle to empower consumers subject to PDAAs.65
III.

THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT

A detailed assessment of the Arbitration Fairness Act reveals that the Act intends to
make arbitration more equitable by broadly precluding its use, rather than by addressing
the procedural issues inherent to the practice. The AFA addresses fairness concerns over
the mandatory use of arbitration provisions, including when consumers lack sufficient
knowledge and resources to successfully challenge corporations in arbitration,66 and when
the consumer has little choice but to agree to a PDAA.67 To reach this goal, the AFA
attempts to reform resolution of consumer and labor disputes by eliminating use of
mandatory PDAAs. 68
The AFA would alter clauses in Section 2 of the FAA that establish the validity of
particular classes of arbitration agreements.69 The crux of the bill provides that,
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title, no [PDAA] shall be valid or
enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, or civil
rights dispute.”70 The AFA, therefore, would preclude all forms of PDAA, ultimately
relegating consumer arbitration to voluntary, post-dispute arbitration proceedings.
The AFA would also establish that, under Section 2 of the FAA, the validity and
enforceability of an arbitration agreement “shall be determined by a court, rather than an
arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing such
64

See Carolyn Shapiro, Arbitration Uber Alles in the Supreme Court, CHICAGO-KENT COLL. OF L. FAC.
BLOG, (June 21, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/06/21/arbitration-uber-alles-in-thesupreme-court/. (“American Express gives monopolists a road map to insulate themselves from liability
under the antitrust laws. And it makes clear to all kinds of powerful interests that they can construct arbitration
agreements so restrictive that no one in their right mind would take advantage of them, even if, as in American
Express, this effectively nullifies a whole host of other important federal rights”).
65

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).

66

Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2(2011)
(Statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“These bills, like the ones that have come before it, seek to limit the use of
forced arbitration clauses in contexts where one party suffers from a substantially weaker bargaining position.
These particular bills focus on consumers and workers who sign form contracts with corporations.”).
67

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017).

68

Id. at § 3.

69

Id. at § 3(a).

70

Id.
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agreement.”71 In other words, the AFA would remove arbitrator authority to rule on its own
jurisdiction and relegate determinations of validity and enforceability to the court system.72
The broad provisions of the AFA are predicated on a number of findings stated within
the bill, which rightfully paint the current overall state of consumer arbitration as an unjust,
secretive process forced upon consumers.73 The bill first asserts that when the Supreme
Court extended the FAA to consumer disputes the Court infringed on Congress’ purpose
behind the FAA, stating that the FAA “was intended to apply to disputes between
commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”74
Furthermore, consumers have “little or no meaningful choice whether to submit their
claims to arbitration,” and “[m]andatory arbitration undermines the development of public
law because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators'
decisions.”75 The findings do, however, make clear that the bill does not intend to eliminate
consumer arbitration as a whole, stating that arbitration is acceptable “when consent to the
arbitration is truly voluntary and occurs after the dispute arises.”76
In light of the congressional concerns over the inherent unfairness of the consumer
arbitration procedure and the lack of consumer choice but to submit to arbitration, the AFA
seeks to eliminate binding PDAAs to equalize the bargaining power between individual
consumer claimants and corporate defendants.77 The AFA’s prohibition against PDAAs in
consumer and labor contracts is particularly broad and would subject all such arbitration
procedures to the same standards that govern post-dispute arbitration agreements.78 Such
an approach, however, fails to fully address the asserted fairness issues of consumer
arbitration. Consumer arbitration reform through practical legislative measures would
greatly assist consumers and would be far more likely to garner the bipartisan support
necessary to pass an arbitration reform measure of any kind.

71

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, at § 3(a).

72

Id.

73

Id. at § 2 (2017) (Finding that mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law due to the
lack of procedural transparency and judicial review, and that most consumers and employees have little to
no choice in submitting their claims to arbitration, and often lack awareness that they have agreed to arbitrate
future claims).
74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, at § 2.

77

Id. at §§ 2(1), (3).

Id. at § 2(5) (“Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the arbitration is truly voluntary,
and occurs after the dispute arises.”).
78
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IV.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT

Although the Arbitration Fairness Act’s moratorium on PDAAs may afford consumers
broader latitude when choosing a dispute resolution method, the Act fails to address
procedural fairness concerns in consumer arbitration. Furthermore, the AFA’s attempt to
empower consumers has missed the mark, because the Act’s PDAA would largely
foreclose arbitration, in which consumers tend to succeed more often than in litigation.79
A.

The Arbitration Fairness Act Would Limit the Consumer’s Choice of
Dispute Resolution, Disadvantaging Consumer Claimants

While the AFA’s legislative scheme seeks to prohibit PDAA clauses, the Act would
allow consumers to agree to arbitration after a dispute has arisen. However, post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate will likely transpire less often than PDAAs because of the
consumers’ lack of knowledge regarding arbitration proceedings and the lack of readily
available information on prior awards.80 Additionally, academics recognize that parties
have conflicting priorities after disputes arise, which makes an agreement to post-dispute
arbitration less likely.81 Corporations are not likely to agree to low-cost arbitration
proceedings, which appeal to consumers.82 Conversely, consumer counsels are not likely
to advise arbitration when the alleged damages are high because a corporation faced with
an uncertain jury trial is more likely to seek settlement.83
Because voluntary post-dispute arbitration is often unfavorable to at least one party, the
current AFA’s prohibition against PDAAs will functionally preclude consumer arbitration
in most disputes. Consumers will be more likely to litigate claims and forego the benefits
that arbitration can provide. A CFPB study found that claims submitted to arbitration are
generally resolved faster than either individual or class action claims submitted to
litigation, especially claims submitted in state or multi-district courts.84 The CFPB study
also showed that consumers are more likely to receive favorable judgments in arbitral
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proceedings rather than in class or individual litigation.85 Consumers additionally benefit
from the majority of arbitration agreements, which require that in-person hearings occur in
a location reasonably convenient to the consumer, a valuable alternative to choice-of-law
provisions, which may lead to adjudication in distant jurisdictions.86 Moreover, arbitrators
often award attorney’s fees to prevailing consumers, and many arbitration agreements
provide that companies will pay or advance initial arbitration fees.87 Ultimately, the AFA’s
moratorium on PDAAs will likely disadvantage consumers seeking relief and may deny
indigent consumers their day in court.
B.

The Arbitration Fairness Act Does Not Rectify Procedural Fairness Issues
in Consumer Arbitration

The AFA’s broad prohibition against PDAAs fails to address a number of consumer
arbitration fairness concerns, including the threats of repeat-player and repeat-arbitrator
biases in arbitral proceedings.88 Rather, the reduced number of arbitrations may exacerbate
the risk of repeat player bias as competition amongst arbitrators increases. The repeatplayer bias theory asserts that arbitrators are more likely to rule in favor of a party that
frequently engages in arbitration, hoping to be hired again.89 This theory similarly
recognizes that arbitral bodies compete for business and asserts that these organizations are
incentivized to adopt business-friendly procedures to govern consumer arbitration.90
Arbitrators are also compelled to make pro-business decisions to avoid blacklisting
Arbitration Study, supra note 6, § 5, at 13 (“Of . . . 158 cases, arbitrators provided some kind of relief in
favor of consumers’ affirmative claims in 32 disputes (20.3%).”); id. at 293 (“Relative to class cases where
a consumer judgment (class-wide or non-class) occurred in 1.8% of all cases, judgment for consumer(s)
occurred more frequently in individual cases, in 6.8% of cases.”).
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themselves from future employment.91 By contrast, arbitral bodies have little incentive to
seek repeat business from consumer claimants who do not often engage in arbitration.92
As the preclusion of PDAAs would decrease the total number of arbitration proceedings,
arbitrators will face greater pressure to be selected in the future, incentivizing them to rule
in favor of businesses more often than before.
Repeat-player bias also threatens consumers when considered alongside the scope of
judicial review that courts apply to arbitral decisions, as consumers may struggle to
demonstrate that an arbitrator’s decision was the result of misconduct. Under FAA Section
10, courts may only vacate arbitral awards where a party demonstrates that the award was
procured by “undue means,” such as arbitrator impartiality, corruption, or procedural
misconduct.93 Courts, therefore, may only review arbitral decisions where an arbitrator has
engaged in misconduct, and courts grant broad deference to an arbitrator’s decision on the
merits of the claim.94 While arbitrator partiality is sufficient to vacate an award, the test to
prove “evident partiality” varies between federal circuits, and several circuits require
evidence from the arbitration itself to substantiate such claims.95 Because transcripts are
not mandatory in arbitration,96 consumers may have difficulty proving claims by evident
partiality in federal circuits that require evidence to challenge an arbitral award if they lack
a transcript to substantiate their challenge to the arbitrator’s impartiality. Without a
transcript or other evidence to demonstrate arbitrator misconduct or partiality, an
arbitrator’s decision will be upheld.
Lincoln & Arkush, supra note 88 at 24-25 (“This previous view of Rutledge’s finds support in anecdotal
evidence, such as the notorious case of Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet, who evidently was
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removed Bartholet from subsequent cases, saying she had a ‘scheduling conflict,’ a claim she asserts is
false.”).
91

Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1615 (2005) (“[T]here is a
strong temptation, especially for commercial ADR concerns, to do whatever is necessary in order to gain a
competitive advantage and increase business. These pressures have led some ADR organizations to seek
cooperative agreements with adhesion contract drafters in the hope of securing a steady flow of business.”).
92

93

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(3) (2002).

Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 122 (“A nearly irrefutable presumption exists in federal law that arbitral
awards, once rendered, are legally enforceable.”).
94

95

Laura M. Fontaine, Establishing an Arbitrator's "Evident Partiality", A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG., TRIAL
EVIDENCE COMM. (2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/ articles/fall2011establishing-arbitrator-evident-partiality.html (“several federal circuits allow or require introduction of
evidence from the arbitration itself to show actual bias for or against a party to the arbitration . . . In addition,
courts differ on the sufficiency and strength of contacts or relationships needed to prove ‘evident partiality’
where such contacts are not disclosed.”).
See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Rules, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 22 (2016) (“R-27. Written Record of Hearing: (a)
If a party wants a written record of the hearing . . . The party or parties who request the written record shall
pay the cost of the service.”).
96

211

The AFA’s broad preclusion of PDAAs additionally fails to address discovery issues
in arbitration proceedings. Unlike the expansive discovery allowed in litigation, arbitration
sacrifices scope of discovery for speed of proceedings.97 PDAAs may limit the scope or
duration discovery, or forego discovery altogether, so long as the arbitrator has ultimate
discretion in dictating discovery procedures.98 Although limited discovery ensures that
disputes resolve themselves quickly, consumer claimants are likely to be disadvantaged by
abridged discovery procedures, as consumers often lack the resources to access documents
or depose corporate representatives to substantiate their claims.99 The limited scope of
discovery, although expeditious, may seriously impair meritorious consumer claims.
Finally, the AFA fails to address policy concerns that consumer arbitration lacks
transparency and interferes with the development of public law.100 The proposed Act does
not require transparency of arbitral decisions, which would restrict consumer attempts to
research the resolution of prior arbitration proceedings.101 Consumers may choose to
litigate their claims, even though arbitration may be more advantageous, because the
consumer is unequipped to evaluate the potential success of their claim.
C.

The Arbitration Fairness Act Does Nothing to Earn Support from Business
Interests to Garner Bipartisan Support

In its current form, the legislative scheme of the AFA gives business interest little
incentive to work with consumer interests towards pragmatic arbitration reform, instead
tempering business interests against the premise of reform overall. The AFA’s current
scheme to broadly preempt the use of PDAAs threatens business interest’s widespread
reliance on such provisions, which serves as a rallying-cry for business interests to oppose
the act.102 Specifically, a moratorium on PDAAs would harm business interests by
97
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diverting disputes from arbitration to litigation, increasing the length and costs of
proceedings while negating the benefits that repeat-player businesses gain in arbitration.103
Moreover, businesses would be exposed to significantly greater risks of liability through
class-action proceedings than they would experience in individual consumer arbitration.104
Business interests are inclined to oppose the AFA because the act’s broad preclusion on
the use of PDAA’s would increase the costs of settling or resolving consumer claims, while
simultaneously providing little benefit to businesses.105 As discussed above, arbitral
proceedings are desirable to both consumer and corporate parties because they are less
complex, and more informal than traditional court proceedings.106 While simplicity and
informality may disadvantage a consumer seeking to vindicate their rights, these features
conversely benefit businesses who often find themselves defending against such consumer
claims. Businesses benefit from abridged discovery proceedings, given that they have
greater resources than consumers in discovery stages and often have little need to engage
in discovery to the extent of consumer claimants.107 Moreover, any risk of arbitrator bias,
pursuant to the repeat-player theory, would favor a business compelling arbitration through
PDAA’s, as repeat-player bias inherently favors drafters of adhesion contracts over firsttime consumer claimants.108 Repeat-player status, in conjunction with the lack of
transparency in arbitral proceedings, allows businesses to leverage their experience in
arbitration.109 While a repeat-player business can maintain records of past decisions and
103
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settlements, consumers lack similar information, ultimately granting businesses an
advantage in deciding when to settle, and when to proceed to arbitration.
Similarly, businesses prefer arbitration over litigation because of the limitations on
liability inherent to arbitral proceedings. Most notably, pursuant to Italian Colors, business
interests benefit from the enforceability of pre-dispute class-waivers.110 Under Italian
Colors, businesses can include class-action waivers in PDAA’s, limiting consumer claims
to those made on an individual basis and mitigate the expanded monetary risk of being held
liable under class-action suits.111 Business interests have a clear motive to oppose the AFA
following Italian Colors, as prohibition on the use of PDAA’s would undercut efforts to
compel customers to sign class waivers, ultimately eliminating the protection from class
action that PDAA’s can provide. More broadly, the AFA would also increase businesses
exposure to liability by directing more consumer disputes to litigation, which imposes the
uncertainty of a jury trial.112 Where businesses can be more certain of results in arbitration,
jury verdicts may be less predictable, may impose greater liabilities, and may compel
businesses to settle more often than they would in arbitration.113
V.

PRACTICAL REGULATION MAY EVEN THE POWER DISPARITY BETWEEN BUSINESSES
AND CONSUMERS, AND ACHIEVE GREATER SUPPORT IN CONGRESS

The Arbitration Fairness Act’s ban against PDAAs will not benefit consumers in
arbitration, and will leave some consumers without a venue to seek remedy likely due to
high litigation costs.114 Because the ban would harm both business and consumer interests,
the AFA, which was first introduced in 2007, has garnered little support in Congress.115
Arbitration reform, however, is not doomed. More sensible provisions may ensure greater
Congressional support and businesses may capitulate to practical reform to ensure that
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PDAAs remain enforceable.116 In addition, consumer-friendly arbitration terms can
remedy many of the fairness issues by placing the consumer on equal footing with
businesses.
A.

Legislatively-Mandated Consumer-Friendly Arbitration Terms Can Place
Consumers on Equal Footing with Businesses in Arbitral Proceedings

The PDAA at issue in Concepcion serves as a model provision for consumer-friendly
arbitration agreements, which federal legislators should use in part to draft practical
legislation mandating the use of consumer-friendly arbitration terms. In Concepcion, the
Court evaluated the viability of consumer-friendly arbitration provisions.117 The PDAA
contained a number of provisions meant to benefit consumer claimants. First, AT&T
offered to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims, and stipulated that “in the event that a
customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer,
requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's
attorney's fees.”118 The agreement offered beneficial venue provisions as well, dictating
that the arbitration would take place in the county where the customer was billed, and
permitting the customer to choose to conduct the arbitration over the phone or through
document submissions where claims allege damages under $10,000.119 Furthermore, the
agreement did not limit damages, it barred AT&T from seeking reimbursement for
attorneys’ fees, and included a small claims carve-out allowing either party to remove the
dispute to small claims court.120
Enacting legislation that requires consumer-friendly arbitration provisions may
mitigate concerns regarding consumer choice and the disparity of resources between
corporations and consumers.121 Statutory provisions that require small-claims opt-out
provisions in consumer contracts would allow potential consumer claimants to choose
between litigation and arbitration, and a statute that requires flexibility in appearance may
offer more consumers the opportunity to seek relief when an in-person appearance may be
116
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prohibitive.122 Additionally, legislation that requires pro-consumer cost-splitting
provisions may mitigate the resource disparity between consumers and businesses, thus
allowing more consumers to seek remedies in arbitration.123 Finally, legislation prohibiting
limits on an arbitrator’s discretion to provide individual relief would greatly mollify
concerns that arbitration is a means for corporations to insulate themselves from
accountability, because the arbitrators would have complete discretion when issuing
damages.124
Although such legislation might threaten the overall freedom of contract afforded to
corporations when drafting arbitration agreements, requiring consumer-friendly terms may
never-the-less find support as a reform measure. AT&T’s provisions in the Concepcion
agreement125 suggest that companies do not completely oppose legislation mandating
consumer-friendly terms. Furthermore, the CFPB study indicates that consumer arbitration
provisions widely incorporate consumer-friendly terms similar to those used in the
Concepcion agreement.126 For instance, the CFPB found that 93% of arbitration clauses
contain small claims “carve outs,”127 a multiplicity of agreements that require the company
forcing arbitration to pay or advance at least a portion of fees.128 In addition, a majority of
arbitration agreements bar shifting company fees to the consumer, and shifting consumer
fees to the company.129 Moreover, reform measures that require consumer-friendly terms
do not infringe on the parties’ freedom of contract to a great extent, because PDAAs would
represent a quid pro quo contract between the parties, in which the consumer may waive
their ability to litigate future disputes in exchange for favorable terms of arbitration.
B.

Legislatively-Mandated Disclosure Can Minimize Arbitrator Bias and
Mitigate Concerns over Discovery Procedure and Judicial Review

Statutory disclosure and transparency requirements would make the arbitration process
fairer for consumers as increased availability of information regarding arbitrators and their
122
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decisions may help consumers select an impartial arbitrator. The CFPB found that a vast
majority of arbitration agreements do not contain confidentiality and/or non-disclosure
provisions regarding the results of the proceedings.130 These results show that parties who
impose arbitration may not oppose disclosing arbitral decisions. Proceedings can become
more transparent by following California’s approach, which requires that arbitration
companies publish quarterly reports on their website. 131 These reports must disclose if the
arbitration arose from a PDAA, the non-consumer party’s name, how often they are a party
in arbitration, the subject matter of the dispute, which party prevailed, the relevant dates of
the proceeding, the disposition, the claim amount and any awards, and the name of the
arbitrator.132 Further, California statute establishes that that a failure to disclose relevant
information or conflicts pertinent to arbitration is grounds to vacate an award, even when
no arbitrator misconduct affected the outcome.133 Mandated disclosure of proceeding
details and arbitrator conflicts might expose pro-business biases, which would allow
consumers to weed-out potential arbitrators with a history of decisions favoring repeatplayers. As such, a statutory requirement to publish arbitration reports on provider’s
websites can substantially improve consumer claimant’s access to arbitration data,
ultimately improving knowledge of the practice, and their chances before a tribunal.
A more passive approach to resolving transparency issues is to legislatively preclude
pre-dispute confidentiality provisions altogether, and by permitting the potential claimants
to collect and disseminate information on arbitrators and proceedings. Professor Lisa
Blomgren Amsler has recognized a multitude of websites designed to crowdsource
information on employers, and individuals need only create their own arbitration review
website.134 With an outlet to compile data on arbitrations, consumers can mitigate the
repeat-player effect through the crowdsourcing of information about arbitrators and
arbitration service providers, as arbitrators will then be encouraged to consider their
reputation on the consumer-side as well.135 Additionally, this method would not altogether
disregard a business’ interest in nondisclosure. Parties would retain the option to sign a
non-disclosure agreement after a dispute arises, and businesses would have an incentive to
propose a fair settlement to consumers where businesses desire non-disclosure.136 While
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possible, the creation of an arbitration-data crowdsourcing website would require
individuals to take initiative and build such a website, and upload data of their own volition.
As such, there is no way to foresee how effective such a website may turn out to be, or if
it would improve the general transparency of arbitral proceedings at all, but it is a start.
Between the methods noted above, legislatively- mandated disclosure of arbitration
reports on their respective websites, akin to California’s requirements,137 would be more
likely to benefit consumers than simply precluding the use of pre-dispute nondisclosure
agreements (“NDAs”). Requiring disclosure by arbitration providers places the onus of
disclosure on the a more sophisticated party than the average consumer claimant.
Arbitration providers have better access to their own records, and publication on a
provider’s website means that arbitration data is both centralized and complete.
Conversely, a consumer-input option may result in incomplete data sets, given that a
consumer-driven approach would require individuals to take the initiative to self-report
arbitration results in a comprehensive manner. Further, a revised AFA should establish
grounds for award vacatur where arbitrators fail to disclose conflicts of interest, which
would naturally compel disclosure.138 Vacatur for failure to disclose may also mitigate the
repeat-player problem, as disclosure will reveal conflicts, whereas nondisclosure may lead
to vacatur of pro-business decisions, ultimately rendering repeat-player advantages null.
Businesses would likely push back against the California-inspired provisions more so than
a preclusion of pre-dispute NDAs, however, given that the latter provision would still grant
businesses the option of maintain some form of confidentiality. Moreover, California’s
Consumer Data Publication Laws have failed to successfully generate significant
arbitration data, as arbitration providers have not published arbitration data in a consistent
format, ultimately making data allocation difficult, and obfuscating its overall usefulness
in comparing providers.139 In turn, a statute requiring providers to issue reports would be
more effective in informing consumers if standardized disclosures could be enforced, but
a statute preempting pre-dispute NDAs would be more likely to garner bipartisan support,
and in practice may overall be just as proficient in allocating data as a statutory
requirement.
Disclosure and publication requirements will also alleviate concerns over discovery
limitations and the judicial review of arbitral decisions. Under Section 10 of the FAA,
courts may vacate arbitral awards only where a party demonstrates that significant
procedural deficiencies tainted the proceeding,140 and courts grant broad deference to an
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arbitrator’s judgement on the merits of the claim.141 The presumptive enforceability of
arbitral awards ensures that claims will not become tied up in a series of appeals.
Undercutting the enforceability of arbitral awards would only undermine a fundamental
goal of arbitration.142
Because extensive judicial review may jeopardize the finality of arbitral awards,
business groups would likely oppose any measure that expands judicial review. Therefore,
information on arbitrator decisions is crucial to aid consumers in appealing procedurallydeficient awards. Disclosing awards will assist parties seeking vacatur, as allegations of
partiality may be easier to substantiate with a record of an arbitrator’s former cases and
decisions. Furthermore, the enactment of statutory transcription requirements may provide
evidence for consumers on appeal. Currently, however, no standard requirement that
mandates the transcription of arbitration proceedings exists,143 and procedural rules that do
offer transcription often require the parties to pay for the service.144 Rules requiring
transcription or recording of arbitral proceedings may improve consumer claimant’s
chances of obtaining vacatur of awards, as an available record would aid parties that allege
procedural missteps, and although a written transcript may prohibitively increase
arbitration costs, a mandated audio or video recording of proceedings may serve as a costeffective alternative. Similarly, transcripts and records of an arbitrator’s decision on
motions for discovery can assist in the appeal of restrictive discovery limitations, which
may incentivize arbitrators to provide sufficiently broad discovery based on the merits of
a case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Arbitration Fairness Act seeks to implement much needed reform in the field of
consumer arbitration, but does so in a manner that would ultimately end the practice of
consumer arbitration.145 Research evidence proves the merits of settling consumer disputes
through arbitration for consumers in terms of cost and efficiency, and warrant taking a
second look at the AFA’s legislative scheme.146 Through practical legislative solutions,
Carbonneau, supra note 5, at 122 (“A nearly irrefutable presumption exists in federal law that arbitral
awards, once rendered, are legally enforceable.”).
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such as requiring consumer-friendly clauses and broader transparency measures, the AFA
can better address fairness concerns in the field without precluding the use of the costeffective dispute resolution practice that is arbitration.147 Implementing such reforms
would better tailor arbitration to the consumer’s needs, would help legislators facilitate
passage of the AFA, and would serve to benefit both consumers and corporations alike.148
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